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"WE PLACE OUR TRUST -"
VINCENT BALDWIN*
37RUSTS and their administration have received the particular
solicitude of chancellors ever since those "keepers of the king's
conscience" first began to leaven the common law with "the
rules of equity and good conscience." In those medieval times,
the chancellor, who was invariably a cleric and usually a bishop,
began gradually to develop a procedure which was adapted to
deal effectively with fiduciary relationships. The ecclesiastical
courts of that day had been accustomed to punish breaches of
trust by spiritual censure, enforced penance, and excommunica-
tion. The procedure which the chancellors borrowed from them,
in principle at least, is summary: The chancellor sends for the
defendant to be examined concerning the charges of the petition
or complaint (to do this authoritatively he devises and employs
a new writ-the writ of subpoena wherein defendant is com-
manded to appear upon pain of forfeiting a sum of money,
e.g. subpoena centum librarum); the defendant appears and is
examined upon oath and made to answer the complaint, sentence
by sentence; and the chancellor decides both questions of fact
and of law involved in the controversy.
Thus the chancellor came to enforce uses, trusts, and con-
fidences. According to an ancient rhyme, the chancellor pos-
sessed full sway in these fields:
These three give place in court of conscience
Fraud, accident and breach of confidence.
In so doing, he brings to his task certain maxims, some of which
undoubtedly are borrowed from canon and civil law' but which
in the main are grounded in the "law of nature" and follow
closely the rules of the common law.
The centuries roll on; the ecclesiastical character of the in-
cumbents of the chancellery changes. Wolsey is the last great
divine to fill it. Thereafter lawyers are in the ascendancy. In
the reign of James I occurs that great quarrel between Lord
Chancellor Ellesmere and Chief Justice Coke, as a result of
which the pre-eminence of the Court of Chancery was upheld
* Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 Corpus Juris Canonici, Liber Sextus: Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure.
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by the King. In order for the chancery to implement its maxims
about trust and fraud, it must needs have power to prohibit the
execution of judgments of the courts of law (whenever un-
conscionable) and to address its injunctions not to the judges
but to the very party, to restrain him from taking action which
would be inequitable. With the reign of Charles II, the era of
equity jurisprudence may be said to be ushered in. In 1673,
Sir Heneage Finch (afterward Earl of Nottingham) receives the
Great Seal and distinguishes himself by being the first in that
succession of illustrious magistrates 2 by whom equity was re-
fined into a system almost as determinate and positive and as
emancipated from individual caprice and opinion as the common
law itself. Equity was no longer meted out and "measured by
the chancellor's foot." It had become a judicial science; as it was
so perfectly expressed by Professor Maitland:
Equity had come not to destroy the law but to fulfill it. Every jot and
tittle of the law was to be obeyed, but when all this had been done, some-
thing might yet be needful-something that equity would require.3
That the trust device was able to survive the death-dealing
effect of the Statute of Uses4 was testimonial proof of its es-
sential vitality and utility. By the time of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, the law as to active trusts had become fairly well stated.
The enormous increase and accumulation of intangible or cap-
italistic wealth created by the application of steam power to
erstwhile home-spun methods of manufacture gave rise to new
applications of the active trust. Trustees were called upon to
perform more and more important duties, to assume managerial
responsibilities, and to handle and discharge vicariously for set-
tlors and cestuis large and burdensome business affairs. The juris-
2 1682 - Sir Francis North 1737 - Hardwicke
1693 - Sir John Somers 1757 - Northington
1705 - Cowper 1766 - Camden
1713 - Harcourt 1778 - Thurlow
1725 - King 1793 - Loughborough
1733 - Talbot 1801 - Eldon
3 Maitland, "Equity," Course of Lectures at Cambridge .University (Cambridge
Press, 1920), 17.
4 "When any person shall be seized of lands, etc. to the use, confidence, or
trust of any other person or body politic, the person or corporation entitled to
the use in fee-simple, fee-tail, for life or years, or otherwise, shall from thenceforth
stand and be seized and possessed of the land, etc. of and in the like estates as
they have in the use, trust or confidence; and that the estate of the person
so seized to uses shall be deemed to be in him or them that have the use, in
such quality, manner, form and condition as they had before in the use."
Statute of Uses, enacted by Parliament in 1535, 27th year of reign of Henry VIII.
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diction of courts of equity over such trusts creating uses not ex-
ecuted by the Statute' has grown apace with the expanded use
of the device itself.
In modern economic society, the trust has become virtually
the most important medium for the preservation and transmis-
sion of property from one generation to the next. According to
the latest report of the Comptroller of the Currency of the
United States,' the 1913 national banks possessed of trust powers
(of which 362 were reported as not exercising same) were ad-
ministering, as of the close of the government's fiscal year ended
June 30, 1937, trust estates with assets aggregating $9,656,397,140
in amount. To show the rapid increase, even in the past few
years, of property held in trust, similar assets with the 1856
national banks operating trust departments at the end of the
fiscal year 1930-1931 aggregated only $5,241,991,392 in amount.'
As the desire and necessity grows for the protection and dis-
position of property to safeguard against the vicissitudes of a
troubled and perplexed social order plus a tax-ridden economy,
more and more property is being settled. No longer are settle-
ments confined to the wealthy. In every walk of life, people are
wondering how to pass on, or deal with, what little estate they
may be possessed of so as to assure to the best possible ad-
vantage the future of their families. They are turning to the
trust as a medium to accomplish this end." Thus there have
sprung up such innovations of the trust device, inter alia, as
the living trust, the family trust, the insurance trust, the spend-
thrift trust, the educational trust, the investment trust-all hav-
ing their roots grounded in the older forms of land and testa-
mentary trusts.
The ultimate success of any trust settlement must depend
in the long run upon the honesty and capacity of the trustees
whom the settlor appoints. The business of being a trustee today
is not as simple as formerly. The trustee occupies a position
of peculiar responsibility. His selection is usually made because
of the trustor's confidence in his diligence, prudence, and abso-
5 See note 4.
6 75th Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (year ended
October 31, 1937).
7 69th Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency.
8 For a discussion of this trend in England, see "On the Selection of Trustees
and Personal Representatives," 176 Law Times 266-7 (Oct. 7, 1933).
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lute fidelity, as well as in his ability to administer the trust so
as to protect those who, through infancy or other cause, are
not able to protect their own interests. Since it is difficult to
find individuals possessed of the prerequisite virtues of able
trusteeship or to be sure of their possession of such qualifica-
tions, settlors are frequently perplexed in designating their fi-
duciaries.
Financial institutions have not been slow to perceive the
promising field offered by fiduciary business. Their right to
engage therein was first procured in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. The first trust company to be incorporated eo nomine
in New York was the New York Life Insurance and Trust Com-
pany, founded on March 9, 1830,1 although a few years earlier
the Farmers Fire Insurance and Loan Company of New York
had been incorporated with a legislative grant of full power to
act as trustee under the supervision of a Court of Chancery. 10 It
was not until 1883, however, that corporations in New York were
given blanket authority to exercise trust functions" and not until
1885 that permission was given generally to incorporate to do a
trust business.2 Other states followed New York's example quite
generally, but not without reservation, as for instance New
Hampshire, where even today, on the grounds of public policy,
trust companies are disqualified from acting as administrators or
guardians and until quite recently even as executors.18
That this development was a slow process may very likely
have been due in part to the incompatibility of the doctrines of
early equity jurisprudence anent trusts and trustees and their
enforcement over an inanimate entity.14 A corporation, "being
devoid of soul," could not very well have its "better nature sub-
poenaed." Another reason why this development was retarded,
no doubt, was the adherence of English and of American colonial
courts to the rule that fiduciaries were to have no allowance for
personal services unless such compensation was provided for in
9 Laws of New York (1830), Ch. 75. 10 Laws of New York (1822), Ch. 50.
11 Laws of New York (1885), Ch. 425. 12 Laws of New York (1887), Ch. 546.
18 "Any trust company, etc .... may be appointed trustee or executor . . .
but no corporation shall be appointed in any other fiduciary capacity. No trust
company, etc. shall advertise or circularize the fact that it is authorized to act
as executor. Nothing herein contained shall affect the rights of religious, chari-
table and eleemosynary corporations to act in fiduciary capacities." Pub. Laws of
N. H. 1926, Ch. 264, § 13, as amended by act approved May 17, 1935.
14 See note 19 Va. L. Rev. 286.
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the will or trust instrument. 15 But the earliest cases in this coun-
try indicated a growing appreciation of principle that ubi bene-
ficium, ibi onus, that "cheap trustees are poor trustees,"'1 and
hence fiduciaries have come quite generally in the United States
to be allowed compensation as a matter of right.
17
The public necessity for reliable and trustworthy fiduciaries
has been duly recognized by the courts.18 Without such trustees,
cestuis que trustent would have no real protection, and without
protection there is no fundamental use for trusts and trustees.
The advantages of, and reasons for, corporate trusteeship were
found by an early legislative commission of inquiry19 to be four-
fold: (1) fraud and incompetence of individual trustees; (2)
migratory character of people, rendering the individual unsuited
for trust duties; (3) complication of investment problems due to
rapidly changing property values; (4) financial security, stability,
and immortality of the corporation.
Corporate fiduciaries have been prone to capitalize upon their
inherent advantages by advertising their superior qualifications
and their specialization in fiduciary work. What they have failed
to make known clearly to the general public, however, in solicit-
ing profitable trust business, is the fact that in their trust instru-
ments or agreements are contained safety clauses which would
exonerate them from all liability except that incurred through
lata culpa, wilful default or bad faith.
The defensive efficacy of these common exculpatory clauses
has been the subject of much current speculation in the pro-
15 Frederick Vierling, "Compensation of Executors," 10 St. L. L. Rev. 225, vindi-
cating doubt as to whether this rule ever prevailed in the U. S.
16 "Gratuitous services are not to be expected in business relations. Dis-
interested benevolence is as rare as human gratitude. The law is formed, not
on exceptional, but prevailing types. Hence, a policy of allowing compensation
commensurate to the services and responsibility required is essential to secure
the best results." Clark's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. Rep. 378 at 379 (1901). See also
In re Arkenburgh, 56 N. Y. S. 523 (1899); Granbery's Ex'r v. Granbery, 1 Va.
246 (1793).
17 In re Thurston, 145 A. 110 (N. J., 1929); Matter of Salomon's Ex'rs,
252 N. Y. 381, 169 N. E. 616 (1930); N. Y. Civil Practice Act (Clevenger) 1932,
§ 1548; Raines v. Raines's Ex'rs, 51 Ala. 237 (1874); In re Dunlap's Estate,
38 Ariz. 525, 2 P. (2d) 1045 (1931); W. Va. Code 1931, Ch. 44, Art 4, §§ 9-14; Tenn.
Code (Williams 1932), § 8250; Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, Ch. 206, § 16; In re
Smith's Estate, 18 Wash. 129, 51 P. 348 (1897).
18 In re Filardo, 221 Wis. 589, 267 N. W. 312 (1936); Richardson v. Union Mortgage
Co., 210 Iowa 346, 228 N. W. 103 (1929).
19 Spec. Comm. Report of Legislature of N. Y. (Legislative Documents of the
Senate & Assembly of N. Y., 53rd Session, 1830), Vol. II, Doc. 84, pp. 3-7.
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fession, the topic of many articles of recent publication 20 in the
legal periodicals, and an outstanding issue of much litigation of
late.21 The crux of the matter has been well put by Professor
George G. Bogert in his admirable treatise, The Law of Trusts
and Trustees. He writes:
It is quite common to find in trust instruments provisions that the
trustee is to be held in the administration of the trust in question to a
standard of skill and care lower than that normally fixed by equity. These
clauses take various forms, sometimes limiting liability to cases of wilful
default or gross negligence, and in other cases excluding liability in cases
of mistakes and errors of judgment.
Such stipulations have been held valid; it being regarded as within the
powers of the settlor "to select the agencies by which his bounty should be
distributed and to impose the terms and conditions under which it should
be done." . . .
The English and Scotch cases have sustained the ordinary limited
immunity clauses, although giving them a somewhat strict construction,
and somewhat r-educing the effect which one might naturally think they
would have.
22
Public opinion has become somewhat aroused by the exposure
of the legal effect of such exoneration clauses. Trust companies
have been accused of contriving by contract "to do everything
but wilfully rob the beneficiary."2 Moreover, the injustice or lack
of ethics of permitting trust corporations to represent them-
selves to the public as "paragons of financial skill" and of de-
limiting by contract their liability to that of an ordinary, prudent
citizen of "Main Street" has been cogently pointed out by legal
authors2 4 and touched upon by judicial obiter dictum. 25
20 Henry A. Shinn, "Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments," 42 Yale L. J.
359; note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 97; note, 22 Va. L. Rev. 455; note, 37 Col. L. Rev. 130.
On exculpatory clauses in corporate trust indentures, see 31 Ill. L. Rev. 1060;
77 Sol. J. 611; 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw 83; 19 Corn. L. Q. 171.
21 In re Balfe's Will, 280 N. Y. S. 128 (1935); Hazzard v. Chase National Bank,
287 N. Y. S. 541 (1936); North Adams Nat. Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180
N. E. 217, 83 A. L. R. 607 (1932); Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321
(1918); Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 236 N. Y. S. 37 (1929); In re Mann's Will,
296 N. Y. S. 71 (1937).
22 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935), III, 1715, 1717. But see Mucklow v.
Fuller, Jac. 198, 37 Eng. Rep. 824 (1821); Knox v. Mackinnon, [18881 13 A. C.
753, in which Lord Watson said, "But it is the settled law of Scotland that such
a clause is ineffectual to protect a trustee against the consequences of culpa lata,
or gross negligence on his part, or of any conduct which is inconsistent with
bona fides."
23 "Can Trust Companies Be Trusted?" Forum, Oct., 1932.
24 J. T. Pugh, "Strengthening the System of Personal Fiduciaries," 17 A. B. A.
Jour. 575 (1931).
25 "The defendant herein not only generally restricted its liability to gross
negligence but practically in every way and at every turn specifically limited
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In general the measure of an individual trustee's duty and
care in the handling of the broad affairs of a trust estate has
been well settled and clearly defined by the authorities; it is
that degree of diligence and skill which an ordinarily prudent
man would bestow upon his own similar affairs.2" This leads to a
query which is the cause of this writing: Will the professional
fiduciary of the future be held to a stricter code of accountability
than the individual trustee with no special training? There is
growing evidence that this query ultimately may be answered in
the affirmative. Let us examine some of the straws which show
the wind to be in that direction.
In the Restatement of the Law of Trusts as adopted and
promulgated by the American Law Institute and published in
1935, it is stated: "If a trustee has greater skill than that of a
man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty [to the beneficiary]
to exercise such skill as he has."27 It is subsequently commented,
however, that the requirements of care and skill may be relaxed
or modified by the provisions of the trust instrument, although
any such provision fixing a standard of care and skill lower than
that which would otherwise be required of the trustee will be
strictly construed.28 In another topical section of the Restatement
it is noted that the authorities do not justify the taking of any posi-
tion on the question as to what extent a provision releasing a
trustee from liability might be effective to shield a corporate
trustee where the trust instrument has been drawn by an attorney
regularly retained by the trustee or an attorney recommended by
the trustee.29 It is well known that settlors will frequently, be-
cause of ignorance or inexperience, sign a printed form of agree-
ment without realizing its significance upon their rights and with-
out taking independent counsel, feeling that they can rely upon
and prescribed its duty, obligations and responsibilities. . . . But the trustee
should be made to live up to the responsibility . . . which it represents to the
public as having undertaken . . . by the very advertisement of the designa-
tion 'trustee.' " Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, 287 N. Y. S. 541 at 571 (1936).
"The remedy will come when buyers of corporate obligations prove to be more
discriminating and when the presence . . . [of restrictive clauses] will render
the obligations unsalable or unattractive in the market." Lidgerwood v. Hale &
Kilburn Corp., 47 F. (2d) 318 at 321 (1930).
26 Christy v. Christy, 225 Ill. 547, 80 N. E. 242 (1907); Bell v. Scranton Trust
Co., 261 Pa. 28, 103 A. 1019 (1918); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, III, § 541, and
authorities therein cited.
27 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 174.
28 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 174, comment (d).
29 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 222, Caveat p. 634.
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the reputation of the trust company to afford complete protection.
In 1936, the legislature of the state of New York added Section
125 to the Decedent Estate Law,"° in which section it is provided,
in part, as follows:
The attempted grant to an executor or testamentary trustee or the
successor of either, of any of the following enumerated powers or immuni-
ties shall be deemed contrary to public policy: The exoneration of such
fiduciary from liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, diligence
and prudence.... Any person interested in an estate or trust fund may
contest the validity of any purported grant of any power or immunity
within the purview of this section without diminishing or affecting ad-
versely his interest in the estate or fund, any provision in any will to the
contrary notwithstanding.
That the criterion of reasonableness may vary with the surround-
ing facts and circumstances is well recognized."' What amounts
to a reasonable display of care on the part of an individual-per-
haps a farmer, mechanic, or small businessman-may be found
by equity to be altogether inadequate in the case of a privileged
trust company.
In two Wisconsin cases, 2 that state's Supreme Court has
recognized that a higher standard of accountability is due from
trust companies. In the earlier case, a corporate testamentary
trustee was surcharged with loss resulting from the purchase and
retention of shares of the preferred stock of the old Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. In the later case, a
trust company was surcharged where it failed to present in apt
time bonds of the estate for payment after the publication of
a "call" notice in local newspapers and loss resulted due to the
subsequent insolvency of the paying agent. The opinion of the
court in the former case contains this language which is in point:
The performance of the duties of a trustee require the exercise of a high
degree of fidelity, vigilance and ability. Especially is this true when the
trustee is a company organized for the purpose of caring for trust estates,
which holds itself out as possessing a special skill in the performance of
the duties of a trustee, and which makes a charge for its services which
adequately compensates it for a high degree of fidelity and ability in the
administration of a trust estate.
3
80 New York Laws 1936, Ch. 378.
31 Perkins v. New York Central R. Co., 24 N. Y. 196, 82 Am. Dec. 282 (1862);
Dalton v. Hamilton Hotel Operating Co., 242 N. Y. 481, 152 N. E. 268 (1926).
s2 In re Allis' Estate, 191 Wis. 23, 209 N. W. 945 (1926); In re Church's Will,
221 Wis. 472, 266 N. W. 210 (1936).
s In re Allis' Estate, 191 Wis. 23, 209 N. W. 945 (1926).
"WE PLACE OUR TRUST--"
The pertinent language of the later opinion is even stronger:
It would certainly seem that professional trustees, who obtain appoint-
ments as such because, by reason of their large volume of such business
and consequently better facilities, they are considered better qualified for
managing trust estates and investments than private individuals, and who
function as such trustees largely for local estates ... can reasonably be
expected, in the exercise of ordinary care in respect to securities held by
them in trust . . . to follow the status of such securities by carefully
examining ... newspapers of general circulation in that locality.
3 4
Much discussion has been evoked by the case of In re Clark's
Will,"3 where the court opined that a professional trustee or a trust
company should be held to a stricter degree of care in the admin-
istration of a trust estate than could be expected of a private
individual. While its judgment was affirmed by the intermediate
appellate court without opinion, 6 the Court of Appeals did not
seem to be particularly concerned about differences in standards
between professional and nonprofessional trustees and decided
that the trustee had merely made such a mistake in judgment as
any testator risks when he relies on the exercise of discretion
with respect to the disposal of his estate by a trustee. 7
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of In re Lin-
nard's Estate8s took cognizance of- the argument that a trust
company ought to be held to a stricter rule of responsibility but
decided that the facts of the case did not warrant the application
of any such rule, which, according to the Chief Justice, would be
"an advance in the law."89 The statement of facts of that case
shows that eight years after the approval of an executor's final
report and accounting and the closing of the estate in the probate
court, the plaintiff's petition for leave to file a bill of review to
84 In re Church's Will, 221 Wis. 472, 266 N. W. 210 at 215 (1936).
35 242 N. Y. S. 210 (1930). See discussion, 20 Marquette L. Rev. 201; Henry A.
Shinn, "Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments," 42 Yale L. J. 359.
36 250 N. Y. S. 781 (1931).
87 In re Clark's Will, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931).
88 299 Pa. 32, 148 A. 912 (1930).
39 "We have not overlooked appellants' argument, so earnestly pressed, that
owing to the special facilities possessed by such corporations, 'A stricter rule of
responsibility should be exacted from trust companies as fiduciaries' than from
the ordinary individual trustee; but the record in the present case would not
warrant consideration of any such advance in the law. Rulings which involve
enlarged applications of established principles to new conditions, and when
subsequently followed, give rise to what become known as new or advanced
principles, should be made only in cases where the facts relied on plainly
appear and clearly call for such rulings. As we have already indicated, this is
not a case of that character." In re Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 92 at 93, 148 A. 912
at 914 (1930).
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attack the account and surcharge the executor for retaining spec-
ulative securities was presented. The petition did not specify any
errors of fact or law in the account, any new matter alleged to
have arisen since its adjudication, nor the subsequent discovery
of new evidence.
The much publicized decision of the Illinois Appellate Court in
the case of In re Estate of Busby4" somewhat enlarged upon the
measure of skill and diligence ordinarily required by trustees by
its ruling that the executor in that case could only take such risks
as would be taken by an ordinary prudent man "who is a trustee
for the money of others." Presiding Justice John J. Sullivan, in
the reported opinion of that case, stressed repeatedly the high
qualifications of the fiduciary in question, using the following
language:
It knew.., that as a professional fiduciary holding itself out to be excep-
tionally skilled and qualified in matters of estate administration, it had no
right to continue decedent's speculation with the assets of the estate in
the condition they were.
41
A fortiori, the executor in this case, a professional fiduciary, was, in our
opinion grossly negligent in permitting the total destruction of the assets
of the estate herein.
42
The courts of appeal of the state of Washington have imposed
rigorous liability on trustees.48 The Supreme Court of that state,
in refusing to recognize an immunity clause in a trust deed, held
as follows:
The implications which arise from the relations of the parties are as much
a part of the deed as if they were written into it. . . . If this clause be
given this effect . . . it would destroy the entire structure and character
of the trust deed.
4 4
In the opinion of an eminent English jurist, Sir Ford North,
deciding the case of National Trustees Company of Australasia
40 288 Il. App. 500, 6 N. E. (2d) 451 (1937), petition for leave to appeal de-
nied, 291 Ill. App. xvii (1937).
41 At p. 524.
42 At p. 531. Exonerating clause saves trustee against losses incurred through
retaining at the request of the testator the original assets of the estate. Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927); In re Brown's
Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 A. 112 (1926); Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321, 4 A. 758
(1886). But trustee is charged with the same rules of liability whether dealing
with the original assets of the estate or its own investments. Citizens' & Southern
Nat. Bank v. Clark, 172 Ga. 625, 158 S. E. 297 (1931).
48 Welch v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., 100 Wash. 349, 170 P. 1029 (1918);
Stuhr v. Yakima Valley Bank & Trust Co., 149 Wash. 400, 271 P. 82 (1928).
44 State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 28 P. (2d) 1027 (1934).
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v. General Finance Company of Australasia," the more onerous
position of a trust company is emphasized in the following
language:
It is a very material circumstance that the appellants are a limited joint
stock company, formed for the purpose of earning profits for their share-
holders; part of their business is to act as trustees and executors; and they
are paid for their services in so acting by a commission which the law
of the Colony authorizes them to retain out of trust funds administered
by them, in addition to their costs .... The position of a joint stock com-
pany which undertakes to perform for reward services it can only perform
through its agents, and which has been misled by those agents to misapply
a fund under its charge, is widely different from that of a private person
acting as gratuitous trustee.
Another English case of more recent decision46 held a pro-
fessional liquidator liable as a trustee to reimburse the estate
for moneys that he had paid out in good faith to settle a con-
tractual liability of the company in liquidation. He had defended
his conduct by raising Section 30 of the Trustees Act of 1925, 47
which would have made him liable only for loss occasioned by
wilful default. The immunity afforded by Section 61 of the fore-
going Act to trustees acting bona fide was also raised. Lord
Lawrence, in holding the defendant liable, laid emphasis upon
his professional character in this phraseology:
The appellant ... is a chartered accountant carrying on business for
his own profit; and in the course, of such business and as part of it he
undertakes to act as the liquidator of the company at a remuneration. If in
so acting he incurs a loss by acting wrongly, although he may have acted
honestly, I have come to the conclusion . .. that the Court would decline
to hold either that he had acted reasonably or that he ought fairly to be
excused for the breach of trust.
48
Legal grounds for attaching a heavier liability upon corporate
trustees despite the protection of exoneration clauses and for the
better protection of trust estate and cestuis que trustent might
be propounded as follows:
1. Estoppel-By holding itself out as having superior capacity,
greater skill and wider experience to discharge fiduciary re-
sponsibilities, the corporate trustee is estopped from disclaiming
the burden of its representation.
45 [19051 A. C. 373, 92 L. T. Rep. 736.
46 In re Windsor Steam Coal Co. (1901), Ltd., [19291 1 Ch. 151, 140 L. T. Rep. 80.
47 15 George V c. 19. 48 See 77 Sol. J. 611.
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2. Public Policy-In view of the importance to the public
welfare of the function of transmitting, by trust, mass wealth
from one generation to another, it is in the public interest to
surcharge professionals performing such function with stricter
liability. The trust company, receiving as it does special privileges
from the people, must be prepared to assume special responsi-
bilities.
3. Negligence-Any negligence at all on the part of a trust
company in the administration of the trust res might, depending
upon the circumstances, be considered and construed as gross
negligence.
4. Implied Duty-Duties might be implied from the trust in-
strument and its purposes which would be incompatible with
and not "intended" to be covered by the exoneration clause and
the general doctrine of ordinary vigilance.
49
While the trust company is splendidly equipped to give special-
ized attention to the financial administration of trusts and to
render such service with efficiency, there are certain drawbacks
to such administration which settlors and their counsel must
reckon with. Among these may be stated the following:
1. Expense-Corporate fiduciary fees are high and are apt to
become higher;" many trust officers openly admit that their
services are too costly for estates with a corpus of less than
$50,000 in amount; moreover, the basis for fee charges are being
changed over from a percentage of annual income to a percentage
of the corpus charged annually.
2. Impersonality-Being inanimate, it cannot exercise that per-
sonalized and human service so desired in family trusts; nor by
the same token can it exercise the personal discretion so needed
in the administration of many trusts.
3. Personnel-The trust company can act only through its
agents, so that duties must necessarily be delegated, usually to
subordinate officers and employees, none of whom have an as-
sured tenure of employment; hence, the settlor or testator has no
assurance that any particular person selected by him will contin-
uously handle the affairs of the trust.
49 See State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 28 P. (2d) 1027 (1934).
50 See S. A. Coykendall, Jr., "Trustees Insurance Protection Against Surcharge
for Investment Loss," Law and Cont. Problems (Summer, 1938), 470 for dis-
cussion of insurance to curtail fiduciary expenses and relieve against all liability
except for gross negligence and bad faith.
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4. Divided Loyalty-Officials and employees of banks and trust
companies owe their primary allegiance to the stockholders and
not to the customer or his beneficiaries.
5. Inflexibility-Difficulties are always present in dealing with
large corporations, especially those which are under the control
or supervision of governmental bodies. Chief of these difficulties
is the proverbial "red tape," and not the least of them lies in
the exercise of discretionary judgment and the making of urgent
decisions with dispatch, especially when such matters pertain to
the personal welfare of the beneficiaries.
6. Commercialism-The administration of a trust estate is and
necessarily must be a profit-making endeavor with a bank or
corporate fiduciary; should the business become unprofitable
the corporate trustee is always tempted to resign and usually
does; such a trustee is not bound by the impelling ties of friend-
ship and honor to execute a trust regardless of the appearance
of unforeseen difficulties and changed circumstances.
It is not with any thought of disparagement or criticism of
organized trust companies and their vitally important function
in modern society that the author has sought to trace a legal
trend, obviously still inchoate, and to point out patent defects in
corporate as against individual administration of trust estates.
Like good St. Christopher, they have shouldered a burden which
is becoming unexpectedly heavier, and they are carrying through
with it. The reason why the writer has attempted to canvass the
pros and cons of the matter is his conviction that there is needed
in the public interest today a class of individual trustees and a
system of personal or public trusteeship to complement corporate
trusteeship.51 Such a class would and should be imbued with pro-
fessional ideals; be possessed of prerequisite qualifications (if
necessary, governed by statute); be required to provide and
post fidelity bonds or sureties to guarantee the faithful discharge
of their duties; and be required to make periodic accountings on
standard forms and reports in prescribed manner subject to
judicial or state departmental review.52 Not having the overhead
of the corporate fiduciary, such professionals could afford to
51 See J. T. Pugh, "Strengthening the System of Personal Fiduciaries," 17
A. B. A. Jour. 575 (1931), for argument in favor of practicing attorneys.
52 See Uniform Trusts Act, Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act, and prefatory
notes thereto.
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undertake the administration of smaller estates at a more modest
fee charge. To them, as well as to the trust company, the court
might properly apply a rule of stricter accountability, of greater
vigilance, higher care and closer diligence commensurate with
their qualifications and privileges.
Individual fiduciaries of special standing have long been con-
stituted by statute and custom in England and Scotland. They are
known as "judicial trustees" in the former country and as "judi-
cial factors" in the latter." By virtue of the Judicial Trustees
Act54 which went into operation on May 1, 1897, this new class of
trustees was called into existence. The provisions of this Act in
brief are as follows: Judicial trustees are appointed by the court
on application by or on behalf of the person intending to create a
trust or by, or on behalf of, an ordinary trustee or beneficiary;
any fit or proper person may be appointed, including an official
of the court; general and special instructions in regard to the
trust and its administration may be given by the court; an annual
audit and report to and special investigations by the court on the
administration of the estate are required of the judicial trustees;
fees may be paid or allowed out of the trust property as the court
of appointment shall sanction, or a flat fee or basis of remunera-
tion may be assigned to cover all the work and personal outlay of
the judicial trustee.55
To supplement the work of private, professional, and corporate
trustees in England there was established the office of Public
Trustee, which has been functioning successfully since 1906. Ac-
cording to the enabling Act of Parliament, 6 the office "shall be
a corporation solely under that name with perpetual succession
and an official seal. The State guarantees to make good to the
beneficiary losses which an ordinary trustee would be liable to
make good and this guarantee covers the acts and defaults of the
public trustee officers. ' 57 A big factor in the success of that office
has been the reasonableness of its fees. 5
58 Lewin, Trusts (14th ed.), Ch. 15, p. 607 and footnotes.
54 Judicial Trustees Act (1896), 59 & 60 Vict. c. 35.
55 Lewin, Trusts, Ch. 15, p. 607 et seq.
56 Public Trustees Act (1896), 59 & 60 Vict. c. 35, as amended by 6 Edw. VII
c. 55 (1906).
57 Ibid., § 1 (2).
58 Capital Fees:
10 s. per cent (per £100) for first £5,000
7 s. 6 d. per cent for next £20,000
3 s. 9 d. per cent for next £25,000
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As in the administration of law itself, so in the administration
of trusts, there can be no such thing as finality. In those fitting
words of Lord Justice Bowen:
It changes, it must change, it ought to change with the broadening
wants and requirements of a growing country and with the gradual illu-
mination of the public conscience.
1 s. 3 d. per cent for next £25,000
6 d. per cent for any excess over £75,000
Income Fees:
1 £ per cent up to £2,000
10 s. per cent for any excess
In addition, there is a charge for managerial services. Pub. Tr. Order, 926 (S. R. &
0. 1925 [No. 12681, p. 1631).
Compare fee schedule adopted in 1929 by Midland Bank Executor and Trustee
Company, Ltd. (Manchester, England), 168 L. T. 299.
Acceptance Fee:
Value Transferred Trust New Trust
£1,000 £15 £10
£5,000 £35 £25
£10,000 £60 £43 15 s.
£50,000 and up £185 £ 137 10 s.
Withdrawal Fee:
Value Executorship New Trust
£1,000 £2 l0 s. per cent £1 per cent
£5,000 14 s. per cent 10 s. per cent
£ 10,000 12 s. per cent 8 s. 9 d. per cent
£50,000 7 s. 5 d. per cent 5 s. 6 d. per cent
